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INTRODUCTION 
 
Post-modernism is a cultural phenomenon that has arisen out of a crisis within 
modernism.1 It is distinguished by its negation of authorship, aggressively derivative 
style, and criticism of consumer capitalism. Post-modernism stands in opposition to 
copyright law. It embraces two positions, one more radical than the other. The first 
position holds that post-modernism and copyright law embody systems of reasoning 
that are absolutely incompatible. 2  It advocates the transgression and abolition of 
copyright law. The second standpoint is that post-modernism should be tolerated and 
accommodated within a liberal regime of copyright law.3 It supports the expansion of 
the range and scope of defences available to copyright infringement. This paper 
declines to accept the partisan arguments about post-modernism and copyright law at 
face value. It has a revisionary purpose, to challenge the principles of post-modernism 
that have become received wisdom, and look at them anew. It recognises that the 
debate about post-modernism cannot afford to be conducted in terms of absolute 
                                                 
1 Foster, H. (ed.) Postmodern Culture. London: Pluto Press, 1983; Jencks, C. What Is Post-
modernism? London: Academy Editions, 1986; Harvey, D. The Condition Of Postmodernity. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989; Rose, M. Parody: Ancient, Modern And Post-modern. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Eagleton, T. The Illusions Of Postmodernism. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996. 
2 Wang, E. "(Re)productive Rights: Copyright And The Postmodern Artist", Columbia - VLA 
Journal Of Law And The Arts, Vol. 14, 1990, p 261; Wood, L.J. "Copyright Law And Postmodern 
Artistic Practice: Paradox And Difference", Media And Arts Law Review, Vol. 1, 1996, p 72. 
3 Carlin, J. "Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation And Intellectual Property Law", Columbia 
- VLA Journal Of Law And The Arts, Vol. 13, 1988, p 103. 
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moralizing judgments.4 Instead of heralding the movement as the harbinger of a new 
utopia, or denouncing the tradition as corrupt and complacent, it is more appropriate 
to assess this cultural production in its social and economic context. This paper adopts 
the approach of cultural materialism.5  It combines "historical context, theoretical 
method, political commitment and textual analysis".6 A historically nuanced version 
of post-modernism can make a theoretical and practical contribution towards the 
reform of copyright law. 
 
A Philosophical Critique Of Copyright Law 
Post-modernism is a form of organised scepticism. It challenges the fundamental idea 
that copyright law serves to weigh and balance the private benefit that creators and 
owners have in obtaining a reward for their creative output and the public interest in 
the free flow of ideas, information, and knowledge.7 It tries to "disentangle the web of 
balancing, penetrate its rhetoric, and analyze and sort out its doctrinal elements".8 The 
                                                 
4 Jameson, F. "The Politics Of Theory: Ideological Positions In The Postmodernism Debate", in 
Lodge, D. (ed.) Modern Criticism And Theory: A Reader. London: Longman, 1988, p 373. 
5 Milner, A. Cultural Materialism. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993. 
6 Dollimore, J. and Sinfield, A. Political Shakespeare: New Essays In Cultural Materialism. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, p 7. 
7 The contemporary works on the balancing of interests approach concern American 
constitutional theory. See Henkin, L. "Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing", Columbia 
Law Review, Vol. 78, 1978, p 1022; Aleinikoff, T. "Constitutional Law In The Age Of Balancing", 
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96 (5), 1987, p 943; Kahn, P. "The Court, The Community And The 
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence Of Justice Powell", The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97 (1), 1987, p 1; 
and Gottlieb, S. "The Paradox Of Balancing Significant Interests", Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 45, 
1994, p 825. 
8 Henkin, L. "Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing", Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
78, 1978, p 1046. 
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balancing of interests concept is both a metaphor and an abstraction. The metaphor 
assumes that copyright law can measure the competing interests of stakeholders and 
achieve consensus through compromise. The abstract concept remains silent about the 
value given to various interests. The balancing of interests approach is vague, 
imprecise and ambiguous. It depends not on objective standards, but upon individual 
subjective value judgments about the relative importance of different interests. The 
balancing of interests concept is a symbol of unity. It is used to justify a wish list of 
mutually inconsistent and incompatible ideals. There comes a point, though, where 
one cannot satisfy the interests of all parties.9 The balancing of interests concept 
serves to conceal hard choices that must be made between property in expression and 
freedom of communication. An ultimate decision must be made as to the set of 
interests that copyright law is serving. 
 Post-modernism deconstructs the dominant ideology of private property 
rights.10 This ideology contends that the possessor should take all, that ownership 
rights should trump community interests and that the contents of the intellectual 
commons should be open to private ownership.11 It emphasizes the role of copyright 
as a special reward for the creative activity of authors. The reality is that a small 
number of large corporations use contract and employment law to gain ownership of 
copyright works created by authors.12 They create a vertical pattern of integration, so 
                                                 
9 Copyright Law Reform Committee. Copyright Reform: A Consideration Of Rationales, 
Interests And Objectives. Canberra: The Attorney-General's Department, 1996, p 9-16. 
10 Coombe, R. "Objects Of Property And Subjects Of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws And 
Democratic Dialogue", Texas Law Review, Vol. 69, 1991, p 1853. 
11 Drahos, P. A Philosophy Of Intellectual Property. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
1996, p 200-203. 
12 Throsby, D. and Thompson, B. But What Do You Do For A Living? A New Economic Study 
Of Australian Artists. Sydney: Australia Council, 1994. 
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that they can claim the financial rewards from the production, distribution, and sales 
of cultural goods and services. The commercial publishers support the expansion of 
the scope of copyright law.13 They advocate a narrow interpretation of exceptions to 
copyright infringement that are contained in fair dealing provisions, compulsory 
licences and moral rights. They stigmatize the practice of appropriation with invective 
such as piracy, stealing and plagiarism. The copyright owners have the power to 
interfere with the freedom of communication and criticism. 14  They can exercise 
control over their work and restrict forms of expression that rely upon copying and 
imitation. Increased copyright protection will allow rights-holders to pursue economic 
rent-seeking. The danger is that access to the benefits of the common resource of 
culture will be limited by material wealth. The protection afforded by copyright law 
should not be extended any further because of the paramount public interest in the 
free flow of knowledge, ideas, and information.15 
 Post-modernism supports users' interests in gaining access to, and use of 
copyright materials, at the lowest possible cost. This approach treats copyright as a 
distinctive form of privilege granted by the state for instrumental purposes. It 
subordinates the private benefit - the private monopoly and the potential for reward - 
to the public benefit of free communication. Freedom of communication is distinct 
from freedom of speech, because it consists of more than mere expression or 
utterance. It is a collaborative process that involves a call and a response, a giving and 
                                                 
13 Mason, A. "The User's Perspective On Issues Arising In Proposals For The Reform Of The 
Law Of Copyright", Sydney Law Review, Vol. 19, 1997, p 69. 
14 Drahos, P. A Philosophy Of Intellectual Property. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
1996, p 145-164. 
15 Mason, A. "The User's Perspective On Issues Arising In Proposals For The Reform Of The 
Law Of Copyright", Sydney Law Review, Vol. 19, 1997, p 71. 
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a receiving of information between the participants.16  Freedom of communication is 
vital for cultural development. As Justice Story explained, "in truth, in literature, in 
science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, 
are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, 
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used 
before".17 This necessary dependence on past knowledge gives rise to claims that the 
information should be treated as a community resource. This approach supports an 
open and accessible intellectual commons to encourage learning and education. There 
should be a narrow initial coverage of property rights, and an expansive application of 
concepts of fair use and compulsory licensing to achieve this end. 
 
A Cultural Critique Of Copyright Law 
Post-modernism is also an artistic movement, which raises fundamental questions 
about authorship, creativity, and politics. It has practical implications for the design of 
copyright law. Post-modernism asserts that the author is not the origin or the source 
of a work, but is just an ideological function of the impersonal forces of language and 
discourse.18 As Roland Barthes wrote: "We know that a text is not a line of words 
                                                 
16 Gilroy, P. The Black Atlantic: Modernity And Double Consciousness. London: Verso, 1993, p 
78-79. 
17 Emerson v Davies (1845) 8 F Cas 615, 619 (No. 4,436). 
18 Rose, M. "The Author As Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket And The Genealogy Of Modern 
Authorship", Representations, Vol. 23, 1988, p 51; Jaszi, P. "Toward A Theory Of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses Of 'Authorship'", Duke Law Journal, 1991, p 455; Sherman, B. and Strowel, A. (ed.). 
Of Authors And Origins: Essays On Copyright Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p 93; 
Woodmansee, M. and Jaszi, P. (ed.). The Construction Of Authorship: Textual Appropriation In Law 
And Literature. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994; and Bowrey, K. "Copyright, The 
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releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God) but a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and 
clash".19 Post-modernism subverts the notions of authorship and subjectivity that are 
embedded in copyright law. It is a corrective to the failure of copyright law to 
recognise the importance of tradition. However, post-modernism goes too far in 
asserting that creativity is exclusively the manifestation of forces outside of the 
individual. Creative individuals also have the capacity to transform the tradition that 
came before them and invent new works of art. Post-modernism is premature in 
proclaiming the death of the author. In fact, copyright democratizes authorship: 
anyone can become an author if they satisfy the low requirements of creativity. The 
problem is that there is a slippage between authorship and ownership. Authorship is 
common and popular; but ownership of copyright materials is concentrated in the 
control of publishers.20 
 Post-modernism rejects the modernist quest to be new, original, and avant-
garde. It supports the intentional appropriation and reworking of pre-existing works 
and forms. Post-modernism contends that, at the barest minimum, copyright law 
should accommodate the practices of parody and pastiche. A fine but important 
distinction can be drawn between the two art forms. Parody produces an imitation of a 
unique style for humorous and critical effect. Pastiche also effects the imitation of a 
peculiar style, but it "is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior 
                                                                                                                                            
Paternity Of Artistic Works, And The Challenge Posed By Postmodern Artists", Intellectual Property 
Journal, 1994, Vol. 8, p 285. 
19 Barthes, R. "The Death Of The Author", in Lodge, D. (ed.) Modern Criticism And Theory: A 
Reader. London: Longman, 1988, p 170. 
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motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter".21 Post-modernism envisions 
a society in which "stylistic innovation is no longer possible, all that is left is to 
imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the 
imaginary museum".22  This paper insists that the imitation of past traditions and 
styles is a source of renewal and revitalization. The essence of creativity lies in the 
cross-fertilisation of cultures, and the recombination of different ideas, themes, and 
styles. 23  Salman Rushdie celebrates hybridity and intermixture as a source of 
inspiration: "Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters 
the world".24 
 Post-modernism contends that copyright law should accommodate the 
underlying economic reality of a post-industrial society. 25  In this late phase of 
capitalism, information technologies enable the production of services instead of 
goods, more flexible labour processes and markets, and new types of consumption. 
Post-modernism recognises that cultural production has lost its autonomy and 
independence from the capitalist marketplace. It condones the commercial use of 
copyright materials, because it is essential to those people who make their living 
                                                                                                                                            
20 Schiller, H. Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover Of Public Expression. New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; and Bagdikian, B. The Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon 
Press Books, 1990. 
21 Jameson, F. "Postmodernism And Consumer Society", in Foster, H. (ed.) Postmodern Culture. 
London: Pluto Press, 1983, p 114. 
22 Id at p 115. 
23 Drahos, P. A Philosophy Of Intellectual Property. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
1996, p 63. 
24 Rushdie, S. Imaginary Homelands. London: Granta Books, 1991, p 394. 
25 Jameson, F. "Postmodernism And Consumer Society", in Foster, H. (ed.) Postmodern Culture. 
London: Pluto Press, 1983, p 124-125. 
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through the trade in information and services. Post-modernism aspires to perform a 
critical and subversive role from within this society. It takes images and icons from 
popular and high culture, and relocates them into an artistic context. The goal of this 
artistic tradition is to comment critically upon a materialist society that is deluged by 
the mass production of commodities and the circulation of media images. This art 
marks a surrender to the commodity form, against which modernism held out by 
thickening its textures and disrupting its forms to prevent itself from being too easily 
consumed. The critical force of post-modernism is blunted by its complicity with 
social and economic life.26 
 
Conclusion 
This paper contends that the role of copyright should not be to reward authors or 
publishers, but to promote learning through the creation of a public domain. It relies 
on cultural theory to gain an understanding of intellectual property. It draws upon the 
visual arts, music and literature in the arguments that it develops. Copyright law is 
discussed in relation to the post-modern practices of parody and pastiche. For the 
purpose of illustration and example, it examines the regimes of Australia, and, to a 
lesser extent, the United States. Part 1 investigates copyright infringement, and the 
lack of a parody defence in Australia. Part 2 considers the application of the copyright 
doctrine of fair use to parody in the United States. Part 3 examines the introduction of 
a compulsory licensing scheme for parody. Part 4 questions the need for moral rights 
protection of authors against parodies of their work. 
                                                 
26 Eagleton, T. The Illusions Of Postmodernism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p 132. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
"I'M AUSTRALIAN AS AMPOL": 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
In Australia, there is a tension between the Commonwealth power to regulate 
copyright under s 51 (xviii) of the Constitution (Cth), and the freedom of 
communication that is essential to the efficacy of the constitutional system of 
representative democracy. This conflict has been elided in constitutional law. The 
High Court has refused to endorse a general freedom of speech, but instead has 
recognised an implied freedom of communication in relation to public and political 
affairs.27 The fine distinction between political and other forms of speech has served 
as a bar to artists who engaged in artistic expression without political criticism.28 The 
High Court has held that the freedom of political discourse was not absolute. There 
must be "a balancing of the public interest in free communication against the 
competing public interest which the restriction is designed to serve".29 The balance, 
though, has been skewed in favour of property interests, because of the sacred place 
of private property in the liberal state. In general, the courts have found that laws 
developed to regulate speech are consistent with the freedom of political discourse 
and discussion.30 Only in exceptional cases will intellectual property rights be found 
                                                 
27 Nationwide News Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 136; Theophanus v Herald And Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 
104; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 80; Cunliffe v Commonwealth 
(1994) 68 ALJR 791; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (8 July 1997) and Levy v Victoria 
And Others (31 July 1997). 
28 Theophanus v Herald And Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 122. 
29 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 136 at 143. 
30 Id at 217. 
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to infringe the freedom of political communication.31 The conflict between copyright 
law and freedom of communication has been left to be resolved by a number of 
judicial doctrines - such as the idea/ expression distinction, originality and 
substantiality. The work of Canberra artist, Hou Leong, in the An Australian series 
illustrates issues of copyright infringement and the lack of a parody defence under 
Australian copyright law.32 
 
Idea/ Expression Distinction 
Copyright law extends to the expression of ideas, but not to the ideas or facts 
themselves.33 This distinction purports to balance property in expression and freedom 
of communication. However, the distinction is uncertain and arbitrary because there is 
no guiding principle that can explain when an imitator has gone beyond copying and 
has borrowed the expression of the work. The courts have recognised that the 
distinction between expression and ideas is difficult to draw in practice.34 They have 
developed the merger doctrine, so that copyright protection is unavailable where the 
                                                 
31 Bannister, J. "It Ain't What You Say, It's The Way That You Say It: Could Freedom Of 
Political Expression Operate As A Defence To Copyright Infringement In Australia?", Copyright 
Reporter, Vol. 14 (1), 1996, p 22. 
32 Davies, T. (ed) "Hou Leong" in Artlines, Vol. 1(1), 1995, p 8; Leong, H. "Photographic 
Essay: An Australian", in Barnes, J. (ed) Asian And Pacific Inscriptions: Identities, Ethnicities, 
Nationalities. Meridian, Vol 14 (2), 1995, p 111-120; and Romney, J. (ed) "Protect The Parodist", The 
Arts Law Centre Newsletter, Vol. 9, 1995, p 1. 
33 Baker v Selden (1880) 101 US 99; Kenrick v Lawrence (1890) 25 QB 99; Donoghue v Allied 
Newspapers [1938] Ch 106; and Plix Products v Frank M Winstone (1985) 3 IPR 390. 
34 Jaszi, P. "Toward A Theory Of Copyright: The Metamorphoses Of 'Authorship'", Duke Law 
Journal, 1991, p 465. 
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expression of a work is inseparable from the underlying idea. 35  Post-modernism 
argues that the idea/ expression distinction has become untenable with the 
development of new technologies of digitisation and communication.36 Hou Leong 
scans his face onto a series of digital photographs of Australian icons and archetypes 
to humorous and critical effect.37 He argues that it is necessary to reproduce the 
totality of the original expression in order to parody the idea present in the work. His 
conceptual art breaks down the boundaries that are essential to the logic of the 
copyright doctrine. However, the law is only concerned with material appearances. It 
contends that a parody is allowed to conjure up the idea of the original work, but is 
forbidden from reproducing a substantial part of its expression.38 The idea/ expression 
distinction could be used by judges to mask judgments of fairness influenced by a 
host of non-legal factors. There is a danger that judges could tilt the application of the 
distinction to expand the rights of copyright owners at the expense of the public 
interest in access to information.39 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Kenrick & Co v Lawrence & Co (1890) 25 QBD 99 at 103-104; Whelan Associates v Jaslow 
Dental Laboratories Inc (1986) 797 F 2d 1222, (1987), 479 US 1031; EF Johnson Co v Uniden Corp 
(1985) 623 F Supp 1485; and Computer Associates v Altai (1992) 23 IPR 385. 
36 Frow, J. "Repetition And Limitation: Computer Software And Copyright Law", Screen, Vol. 
29 (1), 1988, p 4; and Gaines, J. Contested Culture: The Image, The Voice And The Law. London: 
British Film Industry Publishing, 1992, p 104. 
37 Davies, T. (ed) "Hou Leong" in Artlines, Vol. 1(1), 1995, p 8. 
38 Williamson Music Ltd v Pearson Partnership [1987] FSR 97 at 107. 
39 Drahos, P. "Decentring Communication: The Dark Side Of Intellectual Property", in 
Campbell, T., and Sadurski, W. (ed). Freedom Of Communication. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, p 258. 
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Originality 
Further, copyright protects only "original" creations.40 It requires that the work must 
originate from the independent creative effort, skill and labour of the author and not 
be copied from another source. Post-modernism insists that the threshold for 
originality should be lowered to accommodate minimal transformations of a work.41 It 
supports the authorities that consider that a parody is not guilty of copyright 
infringement where a defendant has produced an original work by the exercise of skill 
and labour in revision.42 The danger is that, if the originality requirement is set too 
low, it would be harder for artists to engage in artistic appropriation because more 
works would be subject to private ownership. Thus the concept of originality should 
be rethought in materialist terms. There needs to be a stronger requirement of 
originality to ensure that there is a rich and bountiful intellectual commons for authors 
to draw upon to create new work. Hou Leong treats images that permeate 
contemporary society as raw material for his work. He scans his Chinese face onto 
mythic images of national identity produced for mass consumption, such as the "I'm 
Australian as Ampol" advertising campaign and the "Crocodile Dundee" film. By 
copying images and relocating them into a new context, Hou Leong transforms their 
meaning to force the viewers to see the images and their significance differently. He 
wryly confronts the irony of a nation which claims diversity of ethnic composition, 
yet continues to maintain and propagate a rigidly Anglicized national identity through 
                                                 
40 S 32 (1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
41 Greenberg, L. "The Art Of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy And Post-modernism", Cardozo 
Arts And Entertainment Law Review, Vol. 11, 1992, p 1. 
42 United Features Syndicate Inc v Star Newspapers Pty Ltd (1977), SC (NSW), No 2637, 
unreported; Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [1916] Ch 261 at 268; and Joy Music Ltd v Sunday 
Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1960] 2 WLR 645. 
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the mass media.43 However, the Arts Law Centre advised Hou Leong that, although 
his work was the result of the application of independent intellect and skill, on current 
Australian law he might still be found guilty of copyright infringement.44 It was 
conscious of recent decisions that claim that the sole test for copyright infringement 
was the substantiality of the borrowing from the prior work.45 
 
Substantiality 
The substantiality test has emerged in Australia as the decisive test for whether 
parody will infringe the copyright of the original.46 Copyright infringement occurs 
where there has been a taking from a substantial part of the copyrighted work. This 
depends not merely on the physical amount of the reproduction but on the substantial 
significance of that which is taken. This approach is ostensibly objective. The 
problem is that conclusions as to similarity and resemblance may differ depending 
upon the assumptions of the viewer, and the norms of the "interpretative community" 
to which they belong.47 Judicial discretion has been influenced by the ideology of 
                                                 
43 Davies, T. (ed) "Hou Leong" in Artlines, Vol. 1(1), 1995, p 8 
44 Romney, J. (ed) "Protect The Parodist", The Arts Law Centre Newsletter, Vol. 9, 1995, p 2. 
45 AGL Sydney Ltd v Shortland County Council (1989) 17 IPR 99; Schweppes v Wellingtons 
(1984) EST 210; and Williamson Music Ltd v Pearson Partnership (1987) ESR 97. 
46 S 14 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth); Glyn v Weston (1916) 1 Ch 261; Joy Music Ltd v 
Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1960] 2 WLR 645; AGL Sydney Ltd v Shortland County Council 
(1989) 17 IPR 99; Schweppes v Wellingtons (1984) EST 210; and Williamson Music Ltd v Pearson 
Partnership (1987) ESR 97. 
47 Fish, S. Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority Of Interpretative Communities. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980; and Fish, S. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, 
Rhetoric, And The Practice Of Theory In Literary And Legal Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 
1989. 
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natural private property rights. Thus no special consideration has been given to the 
fact that it is of the essence of parody that the work parodied must be evoked in the 
mind of the audience to fulfil the purpose of the parodist.48 Post modernism supports 
the appropriation of pre-existing imagery in order to create new work. Although Hou 
Leong plainly copies a substantial part of prior work, his digital photographs have a 
distinctive artistic effect and character, because they change the way in which the 
original work is perceived by the viewer.49 However, the Arts Law Centre advised 
that a judge would apply the substantiality test and find Hou Leong guilty of direct 
copyright infringement by reproducing the work.50 It advised that a judge would also 
find the Rex Irwin Gallery guilty of indirect copyright infringement by offering the 
work for sale. The strict application of the substantiality test stifles the art of parody 
and burlesque, which are independent forms of creative effort that use imitation for 
critical and humorous effect, and which should be protected in the public interest. 
 
Conclusion 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) grants no exemption in the case of works of parody or 
burlesque.51 Post-modern work, such as that of Canberra artist, Hou Leong, risks 
copyright infringement, because freedom of artistic communication and criticism is 
subordinate to property in expression under the present regime. The distinction 
between expression and ideas has been skewed in favour of the private interests of 
copyright owners. The requirement of originality is pitched too low. The 
substantiality test places arbitrary and inappropriate restrictions upon derivative forms 
                                                 
48 AGL Sydney Ltd v Shortland County Council (1989) 17 IPR 99 at 105. 
49 Bauman v Fussell [1978] RPC 485. 
50 Romney, J. (ed) "Protect The Parodist", The Arts Law Centre Newsletter, Vol. 9, 1995, p 2. 
51 AGL Sydney Ltd v Shortland County Council (1989) 17 IPR 99 at 105. 
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of art. Parody, burlesque, and satire are valued practices because they are a source of 
artistic creativity and criticism and thus serve the goals of copyright to encourage 
learning and advance culture. There are a number of ways to legitimize artistic 
appropriation. Such proposals focus on expanding the fair dealing provisions, 
granting compulsory licences, and providing a moral rights regime. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"TRANSFORMATIVE USE": 
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
 
In Australia, the defence of fair dealing for what would otherwise be an infringing act 
is limited to the purposes of research and study, criticism and review, news reportage, 
and professional advice.52 There is a move afoot to simplify the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) with the adoption of a single fair dealing provision, along the lines of the 
American fair use doctrine.53 S 107 of the Copyright Act 1976 (US) states that fair use 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or 
research is not an infringement of copyright. A finding of fair use depends upon four 
determinative factors: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work 
 
The courts are expected to weigh and balance the private interest of owners in 
protecting copyright materials, and the public interest of users in allowing others to 
build upon the work. The problem is that the fair use doctrine has been elaborated 
within a framework that ranks property interests first. The United States courts have 
                                                 
52 SS 40, 41, 42, 43, 103A, 103B and 103C of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
53 Copyright Law Reform Committee. Fair Dealing Under The Copyright Act. Canberra: The 
Attorney-General's Department, 1997. 
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behaved as defenders of the private property rights of copyright owners, rather than as 
regulators of public welfare. The fair use doctrine must be radically revised to reflect 
the primacy of the public interest in the freedom of communication. 
 
Rogers v Koons 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Rogers v Koons was a cause celebre that 
demonstrated that copyright has the capacity to interfere with artistic communication 
and criticism.54 The case involved a photographer, Art Rogers, who alleged that an 
artist, Jeff Koons, and his gallery had infringed his copyright in a photograph of a 
couple with a litter of puppies by creating a sculpture called a "String Of Puppies". 
The Court of Appeals rejected Jeff Koons' defence that his work was a fair use of 
copyright material for the purposes of criticism or comment. 
 In Rogers v Koons, the Court of Appeals considered the first factor, the 
purpose and character of the use of copyright material. Koons argued that he was part 
of a tradition of post-modern art, which incorporated popular images and icons into 
art work to comment critically both on the incorporated art and the political and 
economic system that created it. The goal of this tradition was to parody and criticise 
the mass production of commodities and media images that have caused a 
deterioration in the quality of society. However, the critical force of post-modern art 
could be blunted by its complicity with the political and economic order. It has been 
contested by art critics that the work of Koons celebrates, rather than criticises, the 
                                                 
54 Rogers v Koons (1992) 960 F. 2nd 301; United Feature Syndicate Inc. v Koons (1993) 817 F. 
Supp. 370; and Campbell v Koons (1993) No 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 WI 97381. 
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banality of materialistic society.55 The Court of Appeals held that the copied work 
must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, and not just a critique of society. It 
found that Koons' sculpture was not a parody of the photograph or its owners, 
although it accepted that the work was a satire of society. This restraint upon the fair 
use doctrine was similar to the moral right of attribution, because it sought to protect 
the public awareness that there was an original work beneath the parody attributable 
to a different artist. Post-modernism denies that the original author should receive 
acknowledgment, because they are not the source of the work. It contends that it is a 
sufficient requirement that a parody must be critical of society at large. 
 The Court of Appeals interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Sony v 
Universal City Studios as standing for the proposition that copies made for 
commercial or profit-making purposes are presumptively unfair.56 It ranked property 
interests over freedom of communication principles. The Court of Appeals found that 
Koons' substantial profit from his intentionally exploitative use of Rogers' work 
militated against the finding of fair use. It emphasized Koons' conduct in tearing the 
copyright mark off a Rogers notecard prior to sending it to the Italian artisans to 
create the work. Post-modernism rejects this prejudice that art is tainted by commerce. 
It recognises the economic reality that commercial use of copyright work is inevitable 
and inescapable. Jeff Koons denies that culture is autonomous from the economic 
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conditions of its production. 57  He treats art as an abstract, serial, exchangeable 
commodity in the capitalist marketplace. The practical conclusion of this theory is 
that some commercial use of copyright work should still fall within fair use protection. 
 The Court of Appeals held that the second factor, the nature of the copyright 
work, militated against a finding of fair use, because the original work was factual 
rather than fictional. 
 The Court of Appeals found, in relation to the third factor, that parodists are 
afforded significant leeway with respect to the amount and substantiality of the 
copyrighted expression that has been used. It held that Koons could not avail himself 
of this heightened tolerance under a parody defence, because the sculpture was not a 
parody of Rogers' work. The Court of Appeals held that it was not fair use when more 
of the original was copied than necessary. Koons argued that he had made changes in 
the expressive elements of the photograph due to the textual differences - the colours 
and the mood - evoked by the sculptural form. The Court of Appeals was hostile to 
post-modern pastiches, which replicate an entire image to critique a work and its 
cultural values. It found that Koons went beyond the factual subject matter of the 
photograph to copy the very expression of the work created by Rogers. The restriction 
placed upon the use of another's art to some uncertain quotient limits the ability of 
artists to engage in creative expression, and critical comment. 
 The Court of Appeals asserted that the fourth factor, the effect upon the 
market for the copyrighted work, was the most important factor in the fair use 
doctrine. The economic property analysis dominated its perspective. The Court of 
Appeals held that "a balance must be struck between the benefit gained by the 
copyright owner when the copying is found an unfair use and the benefit gained by 
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the public when the use is held to be fair".58 This balance was skewed in favour of the 
copyright owner. The Court of Appeals inferred from Sony v Universal City Studios 
that the likelihood of market harm was presumed if the intended use was for 
commercial gain.59 It found that Koons produced the sculpture for sale, and therefore 
the likelihood of future harm to Rogers' photograph was presumed. The Court of 
Appeals considered not only harm to the market for the original work, but also harm 
to the market for derivative works. However, the copyright owner does not need 
every conceivable marketable use of the product as an incentive for the creation of 
original works. 
 The decision of Rogers v Koons was more responsive to the concerns of 
private property than the cultural objectives of copyright. It was hostile to the idea 
that artistic tradition has nourished itself by borrowing, seeking the collaborative 
energies released in transposition. The decision demonstrated that American courts 
needed guidance as to the meaning of fair use. 
 
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Campbell v Acuff-Rose 
Music60 has been heralded as "the case that shepherded copyright law's entry into the 
postmodern era". 61  The Supreme Court found that a rap song, "Pretty Woman", 
recorded by the music group, 2 Live Crew, was a fair use of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh 
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Pretty Woman." The decision was based on a theory that the fair use doctrine 
supported the transformative use of copyright material, which built creatively upon 
existing works. 
 In Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, the Supreme Court adopted the test of 
transformative use devised by Justice Leval.62 Justice Souter emphasized that the 
question of fair use turned on whether the second work "adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning 
or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent, the new work is 
'transformative'". 63  A quotation of copyrighted material that merely copies the 
original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story's words, it would merely 
"supersede the objects" of the original.64 The fair use doctrine intends to protect 
transformative use of copyright materials, because it furthers the objectives of 
copyright law to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. The standard 
suggests that newness arises out of mixture, intermingling, and hybridity. It gives no 
ground to the suggestion that cultural fusion involves betrayal, loss, corruption or 
dilution. The concept of transformative use provides a set of governing principles and 
values to define the fair use doctrine, which promote the objectives of copyright law. 
 Justice Souter held that parody has an obvious claim to transformative value, 
because "like less humorous forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by 
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shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one".65 Thus 
parody, like other comment or criticism, has a claim to fair use protection. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy disapproved of the practice of pastiche that 
effected the imitation of work without the humour or the satirical impulse of parody.66 
He noted that any modern version of a composition could be construed as a "comment 
on the naivete of the original," because the difference in style and genre would be 
amusing.67 Justice Kennedy warned that, if any weak transformation was allowed to 
qualify as parody, the protection of copyright could be weakened, because it would 
reduce the financial incentive to create. His cri de coeur against creative 
appropriation was surprising, because the decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music 
allowed for greater fragmentary reuse of material. This backsliding judgment shows 
how a proprietarian faith could circumscribe the protection of fair use. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the view in Rogers v Koons that "the parody 
must target the original, and not just its general style, the genre of art to which it 
belongs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original, it may target those 
features as well)".68 This conservative limitation was misplaced, because it denied 
protection to political art that questions society. The Supreme Court also drew an 
arbitrary distinction between parody and satire. It found that a parody had some claim 
to use the creation of its victim's imagination, because it needed to use mimicry to 
comment on the original work; but held that a satire had no such entitlement to fair 
use because it was not restricted to the imitation, distortion or quotation of another 
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work.69 The Supreme Court admitted, though, that parody often shaded into satire 
when society was lampooned through its creative artefacts, and that a work could 
contain both parodic and non-parodic elements. A footnote conceded that, where 
there was little risk of market substitution, looser forms of parody and satire may be 
fair use.70 Instead of persisting with this compromise, the protection of fair use should 
be extended to satire, because it provides the social benefit of artistic communication 
and criticism. 
 The Supreme Court was also concerned that judges have used the discretion 
inherent in the fair-use doctrine to censor parodies which they found obscene, 
immoral or distasteful. 71  It was aware of the danger that an abuse of judicial 
discretion could be used to police art that offers Rabelaisian humour and profane 
criticism because it was scandalous and offensive to the aesthetic tastes and the social 
mores of the public. The Supreme Court stated that whether parody was in good taste 
or bad taste does not matter to fair use. It sought to prevent judges from imposing 
their moral tastes upon the rest of society when determining matters of artistic taste, 
appreciation, and aesthetic values.72 The obscene work of 2 Live Crew throws into 
relief the contest between repressive censorship of artistic work and freedom of 
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artistic criticism.73 It is understandable that an original author would want to control 
such scabrous uses of their work. Yet, the artistic personality should be tolerated 
because the message is more important than the bohemian excesses of the 
messenger.74 
 The Supreme Court denied that Sony v Universal City Studios called for a 
presumption that every commercial use of copyrighted material was unfair. 75  It 
claimed that the authority calls for "a sensitive balancing of interests", so that the 
commercial use of an activity was weighed along with other factors in fair use 
decisions. 76  The Supreme Court found the idea that commerce automatically 
corrupted the products of the imagination was a pious fiction. It commented that the 
educational uses protected under s 107 are generally carried out for commercial gain. 
The Supreme Court was conscious of the post-modern view that the boundary 
between culture and the capitalist marketplace has blurred. 77  It quoted Samuel 
Johnson's statement that "no man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money", 
recognising the economic reality that artists need to support themselves and their 
work.78 The Supreme Court submitted that the significance of the commercial use of 
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copyrighted material depended upon its context. The danger is that the decision still 
permits judges to rank property concerns over free communication under the cover of 
balancing of interests. 
 The Supreme Court recognised that the second factor, the nature of the work, 
does not "help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a 
parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive 
works".79 
 The Supreme Court held, in relation to the third factor, that the amount and the 
substantiality of the borrowing from the original work must be "reasonable in relation 
to the purpose of the copying".80 It argued that, since parody relied upon imitation to 
achieve its comic and critical effects, it was entitled to at least "conjure up" the 
original to make its target recognisable.81 Copying does not become excessive in 
relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original's heart. 
The question of fairness depended upon the amount taken in the context of the work's 
parodic purpose and character, its transformative elements, and considerations of the 
potential for market substitution. The Supreme Court adapted the requirement of 
substantiality to promote the freedom of artistic communication and criticism. It 
concluded that, although 2 Live Crew copied the lyrics and the bass riff of the 
Orbison song, it also produced different sounds, interposing "scraper" noise, 
overlaying the music with solos in different keys, and altering the drum beat. 
 The Supreme Court held that, under the fourth factor, copyright protection 
was limited to the harm that was caused by market substitution, and did not extend to 
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works, which suppressed but did not usurp demand for the original. It affirmed that 
"parody may legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as 
well as artistically". 82  The Supreme Court inferred from Sony v Universal City 
Studios that there was no presumption of market harm just because the new work was 
done for commercial purposes, at least where the work involved a transformative 
use.83 It was more likely that a pure parody would not cause market harm, because the 
original and the parody would usually serve different markets. The Supreme Court 
stated that the market for potential derivative uses included only those that creators of 
original works would develop or license others to develop. There was no protectable 
derivative market for criticism, because authors would be unlikely to exploit this use. 
The Supreme Court decision emphasised that market harm may be addressed only 
through "a sensitive balancing of interests". 84  This careless language could be 
exploited to support a finding that an original work and its parody serve the same 
market. 
 The significance of the Supreme Court decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose 
Music has been contested in subsequent court cases.85  In Liebovitz v Paramount 
Pictures, a District Court held that an advertisement for the Naked Gun 33 1/3 
featuring Leslie Nielsen was a parody and a fair use of Annie Leibovitz's photograph 
of the pregnant actress Demi Moore.86 It followed Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music in its 
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decision "that the purposes of copyright are best served by finding that the highly 
transformative character of the Nielsen ad trumps its admittedly commercial 
purpose".87 In Dr. Seuss Enterprises v Penguin Books, the Court of Appeals held that 
a book, The Cat Not In The Hat, which retold the incidents of the OJ Simpson murder 
trial, was not a fair use of the book, The Cat In The Hat.88 It found that the satirical 
work was not closely enough targeted at the original to warrant special consideration 
as a parody. The decision demonstrated that Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music can be 
subverted to suit the ends of private property. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion about the American fair use doctrine is relevant to the reform of the 
fair dealing provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). It suggests that a single fair 
dealing provision should be adopted, and the range of dealings considered to be fair 
must be broadened beyond those presently protected to permit greater access to 
copyright materials. However, such a provision should be driven by a coherent theory 
of purpose that explains how judicial discretion should be exercised. In the United 
States, the fair use doctrine has become unsettled and inconstant because of the vain 
effort to balance competing interests. A choice must be made as to which interests are 
being served. The case of Rogers v Koons illustrates that copyright has the capacity to 
interfere with the freedom of communication and criticism, if fair dealing is 
restrictively construed. The decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music demonstrates 
that a broad fair dealing standard is needed to protect transformative uses of copyright 
materials. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
"DO THE HONKY STOMP": 
COMPULSORY LICENSING 
 
The compulsory licence professes to strike "a balance between the rights of the 
copyright owner and the interests of the public".89 It provides a defence to copyright 
infringement subject to the payment of royalties and the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. 90  The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) grants a significant number of 
compulsory licences, which allow for the use of copyrighted materials without the 
permission of the copyright owner.91 They are designed to support social policies in 
relation to education, culture, and communications. A compulsory licensing scheme 
has been advocated to accommodate artistic appropriation.92 Hamilton argued that the 
owner should relinquish the right of permission to determine who will use the work, 
but retain the right to extract remuneration for the use or the sale of the work: "It is a 
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Solomon-like division of the property, but it seems intuitively fair in a postmodern 
era that no longer buys into the notion that works are the conduits of their authors' 
personalities".93 She acknowledged, though, that the device of the compulsory licence 
has been developed in a copyright system backgrounded by the entirety of private 
property law.94 There is a danger that the regime will privilege the pecuniary interest 
of the copyright owner over the public interest in the freedom of communication and 
criticism. 
 
Schott Musik v Colossal Records 
The Federal Court decision of Schott Musik v Colossal Records considered the issues 
that are involved in the artistic appropriation of copyright works under a compulsory 
licensing scheme.95 S 55 (1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) enables a manufacturer 
to make a record of a work without infringement of copyright in return for royalties. 
However, s 55 (2) provides that this entitlement does not apply "in relation to a record 
of an adaptation of a musical work if the adaptation debases the work." The Federal 
Court considered whether a techno dance adaptation made by Excalibur to the "O 
Fortuna" chorus from Carl Orff's Carmina Burana debased the original work. The 
changes made included electronic sounds, transposition, electronic distortion giving a 
harshness to the choral voices, pumping rhythms, various voices interspersed, 
including at one stage a voice saying "do the honky stomp", piano riffs and a variety 
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of electronic effects.96  The evidence disclosed strong divergence in the views of 
musical experts, such as between Mr Meale and Mr Toop. 
 Mr Meale, a composer and musician, gave expert evidence for the applicants 
that the alterations made by Excalibur to the "O Fortuna" chorus debased the original. 
He was distressed that the work was a post-modern pastiche, which breached and 
eroded the traditional distinction between high art, and popular culture.97 Mr Meale 
considered that an adaptation of a classical piece of great beauty into a "techno" 
music piece would per se be a debasement of the original classical piece. He argued 
that the conversion was derogatory to the work Carmina Burana and damaging to the 
reputation of Orff's music, because the alterations amounted to "mutilating or 
distorting" the "one-ness" or "integrity" of the original work. Mr Meale endeavours to 
preserve a realm of elite culture against the surrounding environment of philistinism, 
schlock, and kitsch. He seeks to protect the sacred purity of high art from being 
adulterated by any profane hybrid mixture. His aesthetic supports the conservation of 
cultural heritage at the expense of any innovation that builds upon this tradition. 
 Mr Toop, the chair of the musicology unit at the Sydney Conservatorium Of 
Music, gave evidence for the respondents that the alterations made by Excalibur to 
the "O Fortuna" chorus enhanced the original. He was sanguine about post-modern 
music, which merges the classical and the popular. Mr Toop argued that the Excalibur 
adaptation was a part of a tradition of Western concert hall music, in which classical 
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music was distorted and manipulated through electronic modification. He referred to 
the techniques of arrangers, collagistes, and parodists who renovated the meaning of 
classical works with new interpretations. Mr Toop argued that Excalibur preserved 
substantial and essential elements of the original, and also communicated the 
exuberance and the rhythm of the character of the work. He did not believe that 
Excalibur lowered the quality or dignity of the original work. Mr Toop argued that 
classical work can be reinvigorated by a more contemporary framework, and brought 
to a new audience, extending the reputation of the work in an artistic and a 
commercial sense. His aesthetic suggests that artists need to borrow from the 
intellectual commons to renew old traditions and create new work. 
 The Federal Court held that the statutory licence and the royalties that it 
entails are for the benefit of the owner of the copyright, not the author of the work.98 
It found that s 55 (2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) was concerned with the effect 
of the adaptation on the work and not with the "honour or reputation" of the author. It 
recognised that, at that point in time, Australia had not yet enacted moral rights 
legislation, so as to afford an author protection of his or her honour or reputation. 
Post-modernism contends that such a reduction in authorial rights is justified by the 
economic conditions of a post-industrial society. Hamilton renounced the romantic 
idea that a work was an imprint of an author's unique personality and individuality.99 
She argued that the internationalization of the copyright market placed pressure on 
cultural industries to consolidate their rights. She claimed that the advent of the 
information superhighway promotes a norm of access to information over authorial 
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control. However, it is doubtful that the abrogation of authorial rights is entirely 
justified. The author is not a cipher in the information age, but creates artistic 
meaning in dialogue with their audience. I also fear that United States cultural 
industries will dominate the global trade in culture, with the result that national 
cultures would become progressively homogenized.100 As Stephen Kelen said: "The 
information superhighway is a sewer pipe from America".101 
 The Federal Court considered the legislation and its history to determine the 
meaning of the term "debase" in s 55 (2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). At first 
instance, Justice Tamberlin held that the term "debase" did not call for substantial 
sameness or even similarity in style, instruments or performance. This shift away 
from the requirement of substantial similarity avoids the problems that entangle 
copyright infringement and the fair use doctrine. Justice Tamberlin held that whether 
an adaptation "debases" a copyright work was a matter of degree that involved a value 
judgment based on a significant lowering in integrity, value, esteem, or quality of the 
copyright work. He warned that judges should exercise caution when assessing 
matters of artistic taste, appreciation, and aesthetic values, so that they do not impose 
their views upon society.102 It was necessary to pay due regard to the broad spectrum 
of taste and values. Justice Tamberlin adopted a liberal attitude to the artistic 
interpretation of pre-existing works. He found that Excalibur preserved substantial 
and essential elements of the original intact, and communicated an exuberance and 
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rhythmic character that was consistent with the spirit of the work. Justice Tamberlin 
held that the adaptation was not a debasement, because there was no reduction in the 
quality, rank or dignity of the original work. On appeal, this finding was upheld, 
despite debate about the correct definition of debasement. 
 On appeal, Justice Hill claimed that the court was an inappropriate forum for 
the making of aesthetic judgments.103 He reasoned that an objective test would relieve 
the court from the danger of being an arbiter of taste and engaging in artistic 
censorship.104 He held that the test should be whether it was a consequence of the 
adaptation (taking into account that the adaptation differs from the original) that a 
reasonable person will be lead to think less of the original work. This standard would 
have allowed the court to weigh and balance the copyright owner's interest in the 
integrity of the work, and the public interest in gaining access to a diverse range of 
interpretations. However, this desire to ground interpretation in objectivity was 
misplaced.105 The formal features of a work will be determined by the hermeneutic 
assumptions held by an "interpretative community" of judges and lawyers, much 
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more than any objective standard.106 Justice Hill argued that an original work could 
be debased by an adaptation if it was subjected to repugnant associations, for instance, 
with an abhorrent person or organisation, such as a terrorist or racist body. He 
commented that a parody might bring about the result that one could not recall the 
original without the parody coming to mind in such a way as to diminish the value of 
the original. On this point, he distinguished the decision on the fair use doctrine in 
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music.107 This reasoning demonstrates that the standard of a 
reasonable person could still import a proprietarian attitude to copyright law. 
 Justice Wilcox doubted that the test of Justice Hill would wholly relieve the 
court from involvement in artistic censorship or matters of taste.108 The approach of 
balancing of interests merely hides and conceals the subjective exercise of judicial 
discretion. Justice Wilcox held that the adaptation must be so lacking in integrity or 
quality that it can properly be said to have degraded the original work. He conceded 
that, unattractive though the prospect was, judges are forced to consider issues 
concerning artistic merit and taste. If it was claimed that an adaptation debased an 
original work because it included material having a repugnant association, or because 
it constituted a parody, the court would still be required to make a judgment of degree 
involving a measure of subjectivity. Justice Lindgren agreed with Justice Wilcox.109 
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He added that an arrangement would be less likely to be a debasement where it made 
the original musical work available to the tastes of a different period of time or of a 
different sub-culture. Such comments support a wide application for statutory licences, 
which covers iconoclastic interpretations. 
 In contrast to the fair use doctrine, the Federal Court attached no importance 
to the political content of the original copyright work or the adaptation.110 It found 
that the work itself and the adaptation must be examined and not the prevailing 
political philosophy and ideology at the time of composition. It refused to consider 
the argument of Mr Toop that the original copyright work was debased, before the 
defendant adapted it, by an association with National Socialist ideology and culture 
prevalent in Germany society at the time of its composition in 1936. Post-modernism 
argues that compulsory licensing should accommodate artistic works of social 
criticism. However, the eclectic mix of styles in the pastiche by Excalibur deprives 
the work of specific context and historical sense. The techno remix fails to comment 
upon the political import of Carmina Burana, because it suffers from historical 
amnesia. This ahistorical tendency of post-modernism must be resisted.111 It fails to 
appreciate the resonance of the work, its power to reach out beyond its formal 
boundaries, and evoke in the listener the cultural forces from which it emerged. A 
better approach would be one of cultural materialism, which views a work of art as a 
practice that is particular, contingent and historically embedded. 
 The Federal Court held that the effect of the adaptation upon the commercial 
value of the original work was a relevant but not a conclusive factor as to whether the 
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work has been debased.112 The Excalibur adaptation was a post-modern work that was 
part of the capitalist marketplace: it reached number two on the Australian singles 
chart and achieved sales of more than 35,000 units.113 The Excalibur remix did not 
reduce the copyright value of the original work. Indeed, the respondents adduced 
evidence that the adaptation stimulated commercial interest in the work. The Federal 
Court refused to consider whether the original work was already debased by 
association with advertisements, films, and adaptations licensed by the copyright 
owners. It found "the fact that on a future hearing of the work a listener is plagued 
with visions of Nescafe coffee beans, Arnold Schwarzenegger or Michael Jackson 
does not necessarily mean that the work is to be regarded as already diminished or 
debased".114  Post-modernism accepts the commodification and commercialization of 
culture. It suggests that a commercial use of the original work cannot be a debasement, 
because it has been already traded in the market. 
 
Conclusion 
In light of the Federal Court case of Schott Musik v Colossal Records, I have a 
number of caveats about a compulsory licensing scheme for artistic appropriation. 
The law fails to achieve a balance between the private rights of the copyright owner 
and the public interest in gaining access to information without the need for 
permission. It is tilted towards the copyright owner, because it confers the right to 
receive remuneration for the use of the work, and the right to object to the debasement 
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of the work. It deprives the author of the right to prevent or control the production of 
an inferior version of the work. Statutory permission to use copyright materials is 
subject to an aesthetic veto. There needs to be a liberal interpretation of the scope of a 
statutory licence, which reflects the public interest in the freedom of communication. 
Compulsory licensing also limits access to copyright materials through royalty 
payments. It turns artistic appropriation into a privilege only available to the wealthy. 
There is a danger that the goal of freedom of communication and criticism will be 
compromised by a "user-pays" principle. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"TO SPEAK THE UNSPEAKABLE": 
MORAL RIGHTS 
 
In Australia, the Commonwealth Government has drafted the Copyright Amendment 
Bill 1997 (Cth) to amend the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to recognise the moral rights 
of copyright creators. In the Second Reading Speech, 115  the Attorney-General 
affirmed that the use of a work or film for the purposes of parody or burlesque was 
unlikely to amount to an infringement of moral rights: 
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the introduction of moral rights, in particular the right of 
integrity, is not intended to impede or adversely affect the time-honoured practices of parody 
and burlesque. The moral right of integrity is not intended to stifle satire, spoof or lampoon 
any more than does the existing law of defamation. 
 
Parody, burlesque and satire are considered to be valued practices in society because 
they are part of free communication and criticism and because the intention is to 
provide humour in an effective and creative way. However, the 1994 Discussion 
Paper, Proposed Moral Rights Legislation For Copyright Creators, acknowledged 
"that there may be borderline cases in determining whether certain action in respect of 
a work or film is parody or burlesque or a breach of the author's (or producer/ 
director's) right of integrity".116 Pastiche will be a borderline case, because it lacks the 
overt criticism and humour of parody. The ambit of the moral rights legislation is 
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uncertain, because it seeks to "strike a workable balance between the rights of 
copyright creators, the rights of users and producers of copyright material and the 
community generally".117  The danger is that, in the absence of a clear rationale, 
judges will tilt the application of moral rights to protect the author's reputation and 
their work's integrity at the expense of the public interest in the access to information. 
The controversy surrounding Negativland, and U2 and Island Records throws the 
issues surrounding moral rights into relief.118 
 
Attribution 
The moral rights legislation provides that the author of a work has a right of 
attribution of authorship in respect of their work.119 This is a right to be identified in a 
clear and prominent manner as the author of the work,120 whenever the work is 
reproduced in a material form, published, performed in public, transmitted, or 
adapted.121 The right of attribution of authorship is not infringed if it was reasonable 
in all the circumstances not to identify the author.122 Relevant matters to be taken into 
account include the nature of the work, industry practice, and whether the work was 
made in the course of the author's employment.123 The courts are required to balance a 
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number of objective factors.124  Weir asserted: "Objectivity is required in order that 
parody does not suffer at the hands of oversensitive authors".125 However, there is no 
indication as to the weight that should be ascribed to the factors. The courts are left 
with considerable latitude to strike a balance between the interests of the original 
author, the owner, and the user, because of the vague standard of the reasonableness 
test. It seems certain that judicial discretion will be exercised according to subjective 
and intuitive judgments about fairness. 
 The moral rights legislation provides that the author of a work has a right to 
take action against false attribution of their work.126 False attribution occurs if a 
person's name is inserted or affixed on a work or a copy of a work in such a way as to 
imply falsely that the person is the author; or if such a work or a copy of a work is 
dealt with, performed in public, or transmitted.127 
 Moral rights are based upon the romantic idea that the author is the individual, 
expressive originator of a work. It seeks to maintain a direct and personal relationship 
between a creator and their work. Post-modernism rejects the special pleading of 
authors that they - above anyone else - deserve legislative protection. It argues that 
the author is not the source of a work, but a function of language and discourse. This 
argument is used to justify the practice of appropriation without proper 
acknowledgment of the sources of the work. The case about Negativland is animated 
by a debate over attribution and false attribution. Negativland released a recording 
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which featured the profile of a U-2 spy plane on the cover artwork, and displayed the 
label "U2 Negativland" on the packaging and record label. The band, U2, and Island 
Records objected that consumers would be deceived by artwork and labelling into 
falsely believing that "U2 Negativland" is a record album embodying performances 
by U2. Negativland would risk infringing the author's right of attribution and right not 
to be falsely attributed in a moral rights regime. It is unreasonable to expect that the 
audience would realise upon close inspection that the work was not an album of U2, 
because of cues such as the name and the label's logo. My position in the debate over 
authorship is an ambivalent one. Since I subscribe to a limited version of 
individualism, I must affirm that the right of attribution and right not to be falsely 
attributed is a minimum standard that should be protected. Post-modern artists should 
be able to accommodate the need to acknowledge their sources. 
 
Integrity 
The moral rights legislation provides that the author of a work has a right of integrity 
of authorship in respect of the work - a right not to have the work subjected to 
derogatory treatment. 128  Derogatory treatment includes the material distortion, 
mutilation, alteration or the doing of anything else to a work that is prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author.129  The right of integrity of authorship is not 
infringed if the derogatory treatment was reasonable in the circumstances.130 The 
relevant matters to be taken into account include the nature of the work, industry 
practice, whether the work was made in the course of the author's employment, and 
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whether the treatment was required by law.131 The list of criteria will work in a 
similar way to fair use or fair dealing provisions, establishing guidelines for users to 
follow and courts to apply in a dispute. The 1994 Discussion Paper argued that this 
approach provided a fair and equitable balance between creator and user.132  The 
reasonableness test gives the illusion of impartiality and objectivity. This approach, 
though, creates uncertainty as to what counts as reasonable in a given situation. There 
is a danger that judges will favour authorial interests, in the absence of a governing 
set of principles driving the reasonableness test. Thus the moral right of integrity has 
the potential to stifle artistic communication and criticism, especially that which 
offends the reputation of the author and social mores. 
 The moral rights legislation intends to protect important works, to help 
stimulate the production of unique and distinctive works and to preserve the accuracy 
of a society's cultural record. It promotes the preservation of cultural purity at the 
expense of artistic innovation that is based upon hybridity and inter-mixture. Moral 
rights would give the original author an "aesthetic veto" over the presentation and 
distribution of the work.133  They have the power to inhibit creative activity and 
artistic experimentation. 134  The band, U2, could object to the unauthorised and 
mutilated version of their song, I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking For. They 
could protect the integrity of the original work from being damaged or destroyed by 
the practices of appropriation. In its manifesto, Negativland raised the aesthetic 
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validity of appropriation in opposition to the pre-eminence of intellectual property 
rights prohibiting the free use of cultural material. 135  It advanced Duchamp's 
argument that "the art of selection can be a form of inspiration as original and 
significant as any other".136 Negativland took the view that creativity depends upon 
new and unexpected combinations of existing cultural material. It argued that even 
U2 used the techniques of appropriation, in the spirit of lyrics such as, "Every artist is 
a cannibal/ Every poet is a thief".137 Thus artistic production and innovation requires 
an open and accessible intellectual commons. The great traditions of art upon art, the 
techniques of the collagists, forms of biting parody and satire, of provocation, all are 
impaired by a moral rights regime.138 
 The moral rights legislation seeks to protect from derogatory treatment the 
honour and reputation of original authors and the artistic integrity of their work. 
There is a danger that it could be used to stifle commentary, criticism, and 
provocation that would be otherwise undertaken. 139  Negativland is a group of 
iconoclasts who subject the mass media to ironic and irreverent interpretations and 
readings. They argue that the act of appropriation is a form of resistance to the 
barrage of sensory input that flows from the mass media. It jolts and shocks people 
out of being passive receptors of information, and turns them into active critics. The 
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U2 single deals with the perception of the group of U2 as an international cultural 
phenomenon, and therefore it is particularly worthy of artistic comment and criticism. 
It pricks the pretensions of the Irish rock band to being independent artists with 
musical and political credibility when they are in fact part of the corporate music 
industry. The band, U2, and Island Records sought to silence the independent and 
alternative work, because it challenged the reputation and image of the group, and the 
corporate interests of the company. Art is antinomian in the sense that is a type of 
oppositional activity in the world, a discordant and disruptive voice out to undermine 
any one rigid scheme of living. As Salman Rushdie has commented: "One of the 
things a writer is for is to say the unsayable, to speak the unspeakable".140 The critical 
function of art to be subversive should not be threatened by the exercise of moral 
rights by original authors. 
 In contrast to the fair use doctrine, the moral rights legislation once again 
gives judges the power to censor works that they find offensive, indecent or 
distasteful because it amounts to derogatory treatment of the author's work. The 
argument for moral rights, from the view of the original author, is strongest when it 
comes to obscene parodies. Negativland, for example, subjects the work of U2 to a 
vulgar and profane tirade. It intercut the original song, I Still Haven't Found What I'm 
Looking For, with Casey Kasem's cursing about U2 ("These guys are from England, 
and who gives a shit!"), garbled CB radio transmissions about a search for a CB 
jammer who taunts his pursuers with obscenities, and talk about music being banned 
because of arbitrary and subjective value judgments. 141  Island Records were 
                                                 
140 Cited in Gordimer, N. "Across Time And Two Hemispheres", World Literature Today, Vol. 
70(1), 1996, p 111. 
141 Adler, A. "Post-Modern Art And The Death Of Obscenity Law", The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
99, 1990, p 1359. 
 46 
concerned that the reputation of the band, U2, would be substantially harmed, because 
many consumers would find the scatological language of the recording offensive. My 
view is that artistic communication should be allowed, even if it is offensive to the 
reputation of the artist and the social mores of the public. As Andre Brink declared: 
"All significant art is offensive".142 The aesthetic object does not communicate to its 
public in a purely passive state but only by dint of encouraging, arousing, and 
overcoming an initial resistance. Thus the notion of offence is essential to some 
important forms of artistic communication. 
 
Commercial Nature Of Moral Rights 
The moral rights legislation asserts that moral rights are independent of all economic 
interests.143 It provides that moral rights are personal and inalienable rights, which are 
not transmissible by assignment, by will or by operation of law.144 Post-modernism 
contends that there is a conflict between the aesthetics of moral rights and its material, 
economic reality. It maintains that, although moral rights may aspire to be above 
commercial use, they are in fact part of the capitalist marketplace. There are a number 
of miscellaneous provisions designed to allay the fears of copyright owners that these 
rights will unduly hamper their existing practices. There will be no infringement of 
moral rights by a particular act or omission if it was consented to by the creator or if it 
was covered by a waiver by the creator of one or more of their rights for the work.145 
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Authors could use moral rights as a form of leverage to extract a higher amount of 
return for the use of the creator's works. They could waive their moral rights, or give 
consent, in return for economic rent from owners and users of copyright materials.146 
The moral rights legislation aspires to be purely concerned with moral interests, but in 
fact it covertly sanctions and tolerates commercial dealings. 
 
Conclusion 
The 1994 Discussion Paper declared that the legislative scheme was "a workable 
compromise between the rights of copyright creators, the rights of industries and 
organisations that rely on copyright materials and the rights of the community 
generally in having access to copyright materials in reasonable circumstances".147 In 
reality it is impossible to reconcile such antagonistic interests. The scope of the moral 
rights legislation is uncertain and unsettled, because infringement is subject to general 
modifying provisions that are based upon a reasonableness test. The moral interests of 
copyright creators in protecting their reputation are circumscribed so that they do not 
disrupt the economic interests of copyright industries. The legislative scheme is not 
intended to affect the socially valuable practices of parody, burlesque and satire. 
However, there will be borderline cases, such as the post-modern practice of pastiche. 
The moral right of attribution is defensible. It is not an onerous demand upon artists 
to acknowledge their sources. The moral right of integrity is far more problematic. It 
has the potential to stifle future creativity and inhibit criticism, especially that which 
causes offence to the reputation of the author, and social mores. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Post-modernism provides a critical and subversive account of copyright law. It should 
not be received with either blind acceptance or facile repudiation because "it absorbs 
critique as raw material, nourishing itself on praise and blame alike".148 This paper 
evaluates this cultural phenomenon in its social and economic context from the 
perspective of cultural materialism. Post-modernism comprises two positions: one 
radical, the other pragmatic. The radical stance that copyright should be abolished is 
difficult to sustain, because it avoids confronting the political and economic realities 
of society. This position ignores the proliferation of authorship, and the concentration 
of cultural materials in the hands of copyright industries. It refuses to recognise that 
the mixture of past styles and traditions is a source of newness. It fails to apprehend 
that post-modernism offers little resistance to the new order, because it is coextensive 
with consumer capitalism. The pragmatic standpoint that copyright law has the 
potential for development is viable, because it is responsive to the deeper structural 
changes in culture and society. A historical version of post-modernism can make a 
theoretical and practical contribution towards the reform of copyright law. 
 Post-modernism contends that the balancing of interests approach cannot 
provide an adequate foundation for copyright law. It renders judicial doctrines 
unstable and inconstant, because it is impossible to reconcile the private benefit of 
authors and publishers, and the public interest in freedom of communication. The 
balancing of interests approach tends to conceal the major values and interests of the 
judge exercising the discretion. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles 
and values, but by intuitive responses to individual fact situations. The proprietarian 
attitude to intellectual property assumes ascendancy in the absence of any clear 
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directive as to legislative priorities. The courts need to adopt a charter for the 
interpretation and application of copyright law.149 The standards and guidelines that 
invite judges to exercise a discretion should be driven by a coherent theory of purpose. 
This charter should declare that copyright is a privilege granted by the state to achieve 
the public benefit of learning and education. There must be a narrow initial coverage 
of economic rights and moral rights. There should be an expansive application of 
concepts of fair use, compulsory licensing, and reasonableness in moral rights, to 
protect the free flow of information, knowledge, and ideas. 
 Post-modernism also offers a cultural critique of copyright law, which 
challenges its fundamental assumptions about authorship, creativity, social criticism, 
and commercial use. The problem is that it has been unclear about what impact its 
aesthetic values have within the framework of the law itself.150 This paper highlights 
the practical implications of this critique for the reform of copyright law. Post-
modernism denies that the author or owner should benefit from economic or moral 
rights in copyright law. It supports the claims of the user. Post-modernism contends 
that the practices of parody and pastiche should be accommodated within copyright 
law. It suggests that tests of substantial similarity are inappropriate for derivative 
works that borrow closely from original work. It claims that the threshold for 
creativity in transformative use should be fixed at a low level. Post-modernism 
supports the use of copyright materials for the purposes of criticism and comment of 
society at large. It also condones transformative uses of work for commercial 
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purposes. Post-modernism can make a contribution towards the reform of copyright 
law, because it is the cultural logic of late capitalism.151 
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